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- Work in Progress – Please do not quote – 
 
Since the end of the cold war, and in the shade of an intensifying globalisation, a new 
wave of regionalism has emerged in several parts of the world. A variety of 
competitive political, economic or combined approaches have attempted to explain 
regionalism from different viewpoints, but have run short as their focus is mainly on 
developed countries and ‘success-stories’ like the well dissected European Union 
(EU). According to international political economy approaches, regional integration 
projects are initiated and driven by economic and political factors of demand and 
supply. These are inter alia economics of scale and comparative cost advantages or 
common institutions and benevolent policy entrepreneurs. With regard to Southern 
Africa, the majority of states – besides the Republic of South Africa (R.S.A.) – lack 
classic economic demand factors, as economies are undiversified and intraregional 
trade is low. The potential for economic payoffs and welfare gains is thus very 
limited. Therefore, it seems rather unlikely that those less developed states are eager 
to promote regional integration. However, despite these conflicting theoretical 
assumptions, regional cooperation and integration in Southern Africa does take place 
and has, since 1992, manifested itself in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). Since then, the organisation has shown certain dynamics and 
has detailed plans regarding socioeconomic development and security matters. This 
leads to the hypothesis that additional factors of demand and supply might initiate 
and foster regional integration among less developed countries. This article will 
develop a theoretical framework to capture the demand for, and supply of regional 
integration in less developed countries, as well as illustrate this using the example of 
Southern Africa. In case of SADC and its member countries, demand for cooperation 
and regionalism is particularly rooted in its capacity as promising development 
strategy and guarantor of security. Such an economically and politically integrated 
region can better attract foreign direct investment and donors’ funds by providing an 
enlarged market and – at least the façade of – a credible institutional framework. This 
‘friendly environment’ is especially important regarding the strong economic and 
political relations between the organisation and the EU. The latter is SADC’s major 
trading partner, donor and source of foreign direct investment. The establishment of 
a Free Trade Area (FTA) between the R.S.A. – together with some SADC countries – 
and the EU is in progress. Regarding the supply side, the fairly industrialised R.S.A., 
with its stronger economic demands and interests, plays a key role in fostering 
further integration, due to its capacity as the region’s unchallenged hegemon. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, a new wave of regionalism has emerged in several 
parts of the world. A variety of competitive political, economic or combined 
approaches have attempted to explain regional cooperation and integration from 
different viewpoints, but have concentrated mainly on ‘success-stories’ among 
developed nations and especially on Europe. Most mainstream theories could not be 
falsified due to the special European context and the wide range of factors which 
favoured political and economic cooperation and integration. In accordance with neo-
functionalism1, supranational institutions and strong sub-national actors had 
significant influence on regional integration in Europe, while highly interdependent 
states and their governments had in accordance with liberal intergovernmentalism2. 
Social and constructivist approaches3 derived European integration from common 
occidental culture, and political economists4 stressed the importance of economic 
factors, markets and globalisation. As a result, each approach was somehow true 
and had its own explanatory power. However, these are not necessarily valid in all 
parts of the globe, where local situations and prerequisites are perhaps significantly 
different. 
The so-called ‘new regionalism’5 of the late 1980s provides a good opportunity 
to look beyond Europe and its rather Euro-centric integration theories. The 
emergence of several more or less successful regional cooperation projects all 
around the world raises the question of why initiatives for regional integration often 
take place even among rather undeveloped countries affected by certainly less 
favourable starting situations, compared to Western Europe. Globalisation and 
economic pressures, together with development strategies, constitute some probably 
very high-ranking motives. Going beyond economic aspects and their aim to 
eradicate poverty, another impetus for regional integration relates to political stability 
and security. Cooperation in this vital sector does not only lead to mutual 
understanding and trust, but definitely constitutes the necessary base for integration 
                                               
1 Haas, 1958, 1967, 1971. 
2 Moravcsik, 1997, 1999. 
3 Huntington, 2006; Spindler, 2005. 
4 Mattli, 1999; Mansfield & Millner, 1999; Schirm 2002. 
5 The notion is often referred to as the phenomenon of the appearance of several new integration 
arrangements since the late 1980s although some researchers regard it as a whole new theoretical 
approach (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998; Robson, 1993; Söderbaum & Shaw, 2003). 
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and prosperity in general. The road leaning to further development might need to be 
paved with ‘stepping-stones’ of economic and security matters. 
This paper’s aim is to track down and identify potential incentives, factors and actors 
demanding and supplying regional integration which goes beyond pure classic 
approaches in less and least developed countries. In this paper the role of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), donors’ funds and foreign aid will be particularly highlighted 
and analysed in respect to its influence regarding the initiation and promotion of 
regional integration and as part of a promising development strategy. Regarding the 
supply side of regional integration, the role and influence of a potential economic and 
political hegemon will be discussed, as supranational institutional frameworks in 
those regional arrangements of less developed countries are often in a stage of 
infancy and/or weakness. 
The ‘Southern African Development Community’ (SADC) serves well as an 
empirical example, as it counts the so-called ‘new regionalism’ besides its earlier 
roots. The community has reached a considerable degree of cooperation, shows 
dynamics in its integration process and consists – besides the Republic of South 
Africa (R.S.A.) – of rather underdeveloped countries. From a restricted viewpoint of 
classic political economy, regional cooperation and integration are rather unlikely in 
Southern Africa, due to comparably less favourable preconditions. However, it does 
occur and has occurred. Why and how? 
 
2. Integration in Less Developed Regions: Prerequisites and Prospects  
 
Going beyond classic integration theories of economic or political origin, W. Mattli 
assumes a combination of demand and supply factors to be crucial for successful 
regional integration. Belonging to the political-economy school-of-thought, his 
approach emphasises the importance of economically motivated incentives for 
regional integration (Mattli, 1999).  
Firstly, demand factors regarding the launch and implementation of regional 
integration processes are important. Secondly, supply needs to be provided in order 
to satisfy the rising demand. Without fulfilment of supply conditions, regional 
integration is unlikely to happen (Mattli, 1999: 42). 
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2.1. Demand for Regional Integration in Less Developed Countries 
 
Classic economic and growth-related theories, being part of political economy 
school-of-thought, are the customs union theory and approaches taking economies 
of scale, comparative cost advantages and the importance of growing international 
trade into consideration. 
According to Viner, the creation of a customs union implies an elimination of 
internal trade-barriers among member countries and the establishment of common 
external tariffs on imports from third countries or ‘outsiders’ (Viner, 1950). Customs 
unions and the removal of internal trade-barriers are often regarded as a preliminary 
stage to a common market and monetary union. Therefore, they are one important 
stepping-stone to economic and eventual political regional integration (Balassa, 
1961: 1 f). Besides an increase and diversion of trade among member states, the 
assumed beneficial impact of a customs union is related to positive effects of an 
alleged exploitation of higher economies of scale and comparative cost advantages. 
Demand for customs unions and regional economic integration derives generally 
from private economic actors and thus from the ‘bottom’, as they are assumed to be 
non-state actors (Viner, 1950; Balassa, 1961). 
According to the theory, commodity producers using advanced methods of 
(mass-) production can benefit from positive effects of rising economies of scale, as 
higher outputs will lead to lower production-costs per unit and thus foster corporate 
efficiency, competitiveness and profit. Common external tariffs which discriminate 
imports from third countries will add to benefiting effects for ‘insiders’ (Ravenhill, 
2005: 125). This leads to the assumption that an increase of economics of scale 
and/or the total number of economic actors profiting from it will significantly 
strengthen demand for regional integration within a specific area. 
Demand for regional integration further arises from the existence of potential 
comparative cost advantages within an area. According to theory, different countries 
with diversified and specialised economies can benefit mutually from economic 
regional integration by concentrating on the production/trade of those commodities or 
resources they can most efficiently provide. If no one else is cheaper or better in 
providing those specific goods, an economic actor can exploit relative comparative 
cost advantages and increase profit in cases where discriminating trade barriers are 
non-existent (Ricardo, 1977; Ravenhill, 2005: 21 f). A reasonable hypothesis may 
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suggest that the more specialised and diversified economies are, the higher the 
demand for regional integration from economic actors will be, as their chance for 
exploiting comparative cost advantages and economic gains is propelling.  
In the case of Western Europe as an industrialised and developed area, 
demand for regional integration rooting in the chance to exploit increased economies 
of scale within a common economic framework was probably already an important 
factor in the 1950s, as major countries had quite industrialised economies with 
corporations using machines and mass-production. Regarding economies of scale 
only, a common interest and fairly high demand among European economic actors to 
create an enlarged European Market and to remove internal trade-barriers can 
certainly be assumed. Looking at comparative cost advantages, a similar high 
demand for regional integration was likely. The economies of Western European 
countries were generally diversified and often specialised in the production/trade in 
particular or a special variety of commodities and resources – sometimes over a long 
period of time. Due to these advantageous conditions, economic actors in most parts 
of Europe shared a common demand for regional integration and trade liberalisation 
(Mattli, 1999: 72 f). An example is the European Round Table and it’s lobbying ahead 
of the negotiations of the Single European Act. Furthermore, regional integration was 
propelled by supranational institutions such as the European Court of Justice, thus 
creating a pincer-movement in favour of a common economic and political framework 
(Mattli, 1999: 77 ff; Mansfield & Millner, 1999: 604).  
The European experience, with its rather unique preconditions regarding 
economically motivated demand for regional integration, certainly does not apply to 
less developed areas. Countries with negligible industrial production capacity equally 
lack potential to exploit economies of scale and related beneficial effects. Thus, 
demand for regional integration deriving from this single demand factor is implausible 
in countries with mainly subsistence economies. Chances to exploit and benefit from 
comparative cost advantages are equally unlikely, as least developed countries often 
depend on a few commodities or similar (natural/mineral) resources. With 
significantly less diversified economies, potential demand for regional integration 
deriving from economic actors hoping to realise gains of comparative cost 
advantages will therefore be rather non-existent, too (Axeline, 1994: 183 f; Mattli, 
1999: 64). 
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These outcomes lead to the assumption that other (economic) demand factors 
are decisive in areas where regional integration among mainly less developed 
countries is actually happening.  
Although benefiting effects from economies of scale and comparative 
advantages are small in such regions, the liberalisation of trade and widening of 
markets in least developed countries can lead to an increase in FDI. An enlarged 
market – e.g. a customs union – provides significantly more incentives for FDI, 
compared to the member states’ small national markets: due to more limit 
consumption-potential, probably only more small-scaled compared to highly 
developed areas. In combination with credible commitment institutions that monitor 
common economic policies and ensure political stability, regional arrangements will 
ceteris paribus attract more FDI than bordering ‘outsiders’. Similar effects are likely if 
a regional (economic) hegemon is part of the cooperation project. In such cases, 
direct investment from the hegemon is expected to pour more likely into the 
economies of member states than of ‘outsiders’, which makes membership attractive 
for the latter (Mattli, 1999: 58 ff, Oosthuizen, 2006: 250).  
The effects of different types of FDI on less developed countries are discussed 
in controversy, although the overall positive effects do outweigh alleged negative 
impacts. The main assumption behind this is that those investments will bring fresh 
capital, lead to industrialisation, economic growth, creation of jobs, transfer of 
technologies and know-how, competitiveness and finally to an overall improvement of 
social welfare (Todaro & Smith, 2003: 635 ff). Thus the strive to attract FDI is an 
important demand factor for regional integration amongst less developed countries, 
and a reasonable development strategy (Goldstein, 2004: 7 f; African Development 
Bank, 2002: 48; Schirm, 2002: 21). 
A nearly equally important demand factor is connected to foreign aid and 
donors’ funds. Since development policies of the World Bank, International Monetary 
Fund, the US and EU have changed to preferably support regional integration 
arrangements by concentrating to fund regional development projects and sector 
cooperation (Kösler, 2007; Tjønneland, 2008), the dependent and receiving least 
developed countries have surely seen additional good reasons to participate in or 
enhance this field. Slightly comparable to the benefiting effects of FDI, the impact of 
foreign aid will probably materialise even faster in cases where resources do not 
trickle away. Consequently, regional integration – and implied good governance of 
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participating states – has probably become a strategy to attract the attention of 
foreign donors and external funding by providing a well functioning regional 
framework with credible commitment institutions – at least the façade of it. External 
donors may even (in-)directly influence governments or leaders of least developed 
countries towards more market-liberalising and integration-friendly policies by either 
providing or – in case of defection – cutting down payments (Durth, Körner & 
Michaelowa, 2002: 200; Kennes, 1999: 38 f; Mattli, 1999: 60). 
Summing up the arguments, it seems that regional arrangements are particularly 
interesting for less developed countries considering the higher potential to attract FDI 
and donors’ support. However, demand for regional integration does not exclusively 
derive from economic reasons and prospects. Such an assumption would be too 
shortcoming, as ‘development’ should be understood in a broader sense that 
includes inter alia aspects of political stability and security (Payne, 2004). Regional 
integration certainly can become a successful development strategy if foreign 
investors, donors and international institutions equally help to support and promote 
this process. The beneficial effects of plain customs unions and related economic 
approaches are rather irrelevant to less developed nations, as incentives and profits 
derived from increased interregional trade are relatively small. 
 
2.2. Supply for Regional Integration in Less Developed Countries 
 
Regional integration and its entire effects can be understood as a collective or club 
good whose benefit and quality depends on the degree of its demand and supply. 
According to Mattli, the success of regional integration projects is highly related to 
prevalent supply conditions and especially to the willingness of political leaders to 
satisfy rising demands with required supply (Mattli, 1999: 51). 
However, political willingness and economic difficulties are not sufficient 
supply conditions to guarantee the success of regional integration initiatives, 
especially if collective-action problems between participating states need to be 
overcome. Thus, the existence of (a) policy-entrepreneur(s) as a main source and 
guarantor(s) of supply of regional integration is crucial and has a favourable effect. 
Countries seeking economic and regional integration are advised to a create 
(supranational) commitment institutions which monitor and guarantee the 
enforcement of common rules, and prevent negative effects of prisoner’s dilemma 
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situations by way of, among other things, sanctions. In their absence, an undisputed 
leader, like a regional hegemon, is essential for the success of integration initiatives, 
as he can help to overcome prevalent coordination difficulties. A (benevolent) 
hegemon can thus serve as an adequate political entrepreneur by proposing and 
coordinating common rules and policies, distributing gains through side-payments, 
and therefore acting as a ‘paymaster’ and regional driving force (Mattli, 1999: 54 f). 
The better the prospects for economic payoffs or the more potential for 
increased economies of scale and comparative cost advantages within a region, the 
more likely is the willingness of political actors to supply for existing demands by 
participating in regional integration arrangements. Furthermore, the integration 
process becomes likelier and easier with the degree of institutionalisation of the 
relevant policy-entrepreneurs or a (benevolent) regional hegemon. A small number of 
participants and convergence of common interest within the group would be an 
additional advantage (Olson, 1965). 
Looking at less and least developed countries, supply conditions are generally 
disadvantageous or even lacking, not least due to insufficient or lacking classic 
economic demand factors. Regional integration among undeveloped nations is 
therefore comparably more difficult to achieve, as incentives for each potential 
constituent are rather indistinctive – if one excludes the prospect for increased FDI, 
donors’ funds and foreign aid. Thus the motivation to become a regional policy-
entrepreneur is equally low. Because the gradual emergence of supranational 
institutions as materialised common interest of the constituting member states is 
rather unlikely, an important source of supply appears to be unproductive, and a 
pincer-movement towards integration is deficient. 
However, this does not make regional integration impossible, as it is still likely 
that supply be provided by willing political leaders and/or a regional hegemon who 
realises significant positive effects of such arrangements for his own national 
interests. A potential increase in FDI, and an attraction of donors’ aid and 
international development-funds are surely part of this, and may fuel integration 
initiatives (Mansfield & Millner, 1999: S. 609 f). In the latter case the importance of 
the club good called regional integration and its benefiting effects can be so 
significant that the most affected political actor will strive for it even at a relative 
expense compared to other – most likely also profiting – participants. 
Intergovernmental negotiations are then the mainspring of supply, especially when 
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promoted and enforced by a hegemon taking the lead. A situation like this is not 
confined to industrialised and developed regions but also applies to less developed 
countries with one rather developed hegemon within. However, as weakness of 
states, insufficient capabilities and abundant or unsatisfactory conditions for success 
(Kyambalesa & Houngnikpo, 2006: 9 ff) in less developed regions may hamper 
cooperation and the implementation of common institutions, the success of such a 
regional integration project will then depend on the hegemon’s engagement in 
fuelling integration, the degree of benevolence and particularly the associated gain-
related distributional activities. Then even smaller and not directly affected members 
have the chance to get their share of the common profit, and their demand to keep 
on belonging to the regional arrangement perpetuates (Mattli, 1999: 51, 56, 64). 
Besides those intrinsic motivations to provide supply for regional integration, 
particularly a less developed regional hegemon may face various pressures from 
external/global actors on whom he himself may depend. Through directly or indirectly 
exerted external influence, a previously benevolent regional hegemon might then be 
lured or forced to adjust supply policies of regional integration which can eventually 
corrupt his own and his partners’ intentions and aims (Durth, Körner, & Michaelowa, 
2002: 200 f; Axeline, 1994: 190, 212).   
In summary, developing countries with poor supply conditions face serious 
difficulties to realise successful regional integration. Nevertheless, the existence of a 
developed and benevolent hegemon can diminish this situation by taking the role of a 
‘motor’ for integration. 
 
3. Regional Integration in Southern Africa: The Case of SADC 
 
SADC is probably one of the most constant, realistic and promising regional 
cooperation projects in Africa (Brandt, Gsänger etc., 2000: 167). Founded in 1992, 
the community emerged from its modified predecessor ‘Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference’ (SADCC) and historically even has roots in 
the ‘Frontline States’6 (FLS) alliance. At present, SADC consists of 15 member 
                                               
6 The rather loosely organised FLS consisted of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. After its foundation in 1974/75, virtually all newly independent black-majority ruled 
states in Southern Africa became members of the FLS (Khadiagala, 1994). 
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states7 and covers an area of nearly 10 million Km² with a population of about 230 
million. The community’s headquarters is in Gaborone, Botswana. SADC is currently 
going through an institutional overhaul and deep reform process. The organisation is 
therefore still somehow in a state of flux. Besides the chronic lack of adequate staff 
and equipment, the extent and distribution of tasks, competences and responsibilities 
has not yet finally been settled. However, it becomes clearly visible that institutional 
reforms are aimed at increasing the organisation’s effectiveness, cohesion and 
capabilities, in particular through measures of institutional centralisation (Oosthuizen, 
2006: 39 f, 53 f; Mair & Peters-Berries, 2001: 297 ff, 323; Vogt, 2007: 89 f).  
 
3.1. Demand for Regional Integration in Southern Africa 
 
Most SADC member states are classified as least or less developed countries with 
low income and poor economic performance. According to the World Bank, only 
Botswana, Mauritius, the Seychelles and the R.S.A. are classified as fairly developed 
countries with upper-middle-income economies.8 The latter remains the only9 
moderately industrialised nation on the continent showing significant economic 
potential and performance in a global perspective. Particularly since Zimbabwe – 
previously to some extent a regional competitor with at least rudimental industrial 
potential – has plunged into political chaos and economic collapse (Mair & Peters-
Berries, 2001: 330; Vogt, 2007: 90).  
Regarding classic economic approaches, regional integration is rather unlikely 
or at least difficult to achieve in the SADC region due to an alleged lack of necessary 
demand. Besides the R.S.A., whose industrial sector is well developed (30 % 
contribution to total Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) and far outclasses other 
member states’ outputs in absolute figures (Oosthuizen, 2006: 262; Kalaba, Wilcox et 
al., 2006: 65 ff), virtually all other countries have subsistence economies and lack 
industrial capacity worth mentioning. In accordance with economic theory, modern 
industries with mass-production can benefit most from deeper regional integration by 
realising better economies of scale. The latter could result inter alia from decreasing 
                                               
7 These are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. 
8 The World Bank: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/CLASS.XLS 
(06/20/07). 
9 Mauritius could be regarded as industrialised to certain degree, too. 
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trade restrictions that would facilitate higher production-outputs and allow growing 
exports and increasing intra-regional trade. However, this crucial field of 
economically motivated demand for regionalisation with a potential of great influence 
on politics – as the European case has proved –  does not flourish well in the SADC 
area as its industrial foundation is not bold enough. Instead, in eight member 
countries the main origin of GDP highly refers to small-scale agriculture with 
percentage shares in 2003 counting in most cases significantly above 15 % (e.g. 
58.7 % (DRC), 45 % (Tanzania), 38.4 % (Malawi) and 29.2 % (Madagascar)) 
(Oosthuizen, 2006: 258 ff, 262). These circumstances make it unlikely to increase 
economies of scale and realise related beneficial effects, because in those cases 
agricultural products are mainly produced in small amounts for consumption at the 
local level.  Exceptional is the small number of commercial farmers with enormous 
properties. In most cases they still can be found in former white-settler colonies 
(Brandt, Gsänger, etc, 2000: 92 ff). 
Furthermore, most SADC countries have undiversified economies with only 
few commodity products and (natural/mineral) resources suitable for export – in most 
cases even only to overseas. Some states are extremely dependent on a single 
export-good with percentage shares far above 70 % of total exports, such as Angola 
with 99 % (crude oil and diamonds), Botswana 96 % (diamonds), the DRC 89 % 
(diamonds), Lesotho 99 % (clothing) and Malawi with 76 % (food) in 2003. Generally, 
minerals, (processed) food, clothing and basic manufactures are the main 
(commodity) products of SADC members, with the R.S.A. being the only exception 
(Oosthuizen, 2006: 258). As primary exports of many countries in the region are very 
similar, a lack of complementarities leaves markets highly competitive, and thus 
leads to an erosion of prices and worsening of the terms of trade (Buthelezi, 2006: 65 
f, 164; Lee, 2003: 269 f). Consequently, an increase in comparative cost advantages, 
together with its intended positive (welfare) effects (Ricardo, 1977), is very unlikely 
unless national economies within SADC do not diversify and specialise in different 
commodities or resources (Weggoro, 1995: 38). 
Keeping these observations in mind, it is not surprising that intra-regional trade 
within SADC is relatively low. In 2003 it amounted to an estimated 25 % of total 
(formal) trade (Adelmann, 2003: 52; SADC-RISDP: 13), which is only slightly more 
than the 20 % in 1997 and 23 % in 2000 (Gibb, 2007: 78; Lee, 2003: 102). However, 
these figures are probably contestable, as reliable data is often lacking. 
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Unsurprisingly, other statistics assume a considerably lower share10 of intra-regional 
trade in the region. Without the share of the R.S.A. and members of the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU)11, the rate would probably drop to less then 10 % 
(Lee, 2003: 102). Regarding these figures, high demand for market liberalisation and 
deeper regional integration would generally not be expectable.  
Nevertheless, recent studies show that there is a huge unexploited potential 
for trade creation within the region, as South Africa, for example, could substitute 
imports from overseas in several fields with complementarities from SADC member 
states. If harmonisation proceeded, trade barriers were removed and better 
infrastructure provided, intra-regional trade could grow by an estimated 3.6 billion 
US-$ in the areas of agricultural and food products, minerals, textiles and particularly 
oil (Chauvin & Gaulier, 2002: 24 f; Draper, Alves & Kalaba, 2006: 73 ff; Vogt, 2007: 
283 f). Within three years of the establishment of a SADC Free Trade Area (FTA), 
intra-regional trade could, according to optimistic experts, climb to 35 % of total trade 
(Adelmann, 2003: 52). Nevertheless, this trade potential has not yet yielded 
institutional fruit, as it does not affect all member states equally. Hence significant 
economically motivated demand factors for regional integration are virtually absent 
among the vast majority of countries in the SADC region.     
A regional exception is the fairly developed R.S.A. Its share of total SADC–
GDP amounts to about 70 % (2005). Slightly smaller figures can be observed 
considering SADC’s total imports and exports. However, the R.S.A.’s exports to and 
imports from SADC account only for about 10 % respectively 3.5 % of its total trade 
volumes (2006), which proves the importance of overseas markets and 
simultaneously leaves room for speculation about undeveloped trade potential on a 
regional level. Besides its economic power regarding quantity and value, South 
Africa’s economy and its array of exports (basic manufactures, minerals, precious 
metals, transport equipment, chemicals, machinery, processed food etc.) is quite 
diversified12 (Draper, Alves & Kalaba, 2006; Oosthuizen, 2006: 255 ff; TIPS, 2005: 
131 ff; TIPS TradeMap Database). 
                                               
10 UNCTAD, 2007: 95. 
11 Founded in 1910, SACU is the oldest operating customs union in the world and was originally 
created by the Union of South Africa to bind and absorb its smaller neighbours. Today its members 
are the R.S.A., Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (Meyn, 2006: 67 f, 89 ff).   
12 This peculiarity roots probably has its roots not least in autarky policies of the formerly isolated 
apartheid regime, which had to establish local production sites for advanced manufactured goods due 
to international trade sanctions and embargos. 
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For these reasons, South Africa’s economic actors certainly have demand and 
potential to increase economies of scale – and realise beneficial effects through 
regional economic integration and widening markets – as powerful competitors in 
other countries do not really exist. Subsequently, the chance to flood SADC member 
states’ markets even more with commodities labelled Proudly South African13 can be 
seen as important demand factor for local export-orientated producers (Odén, 2001: 
91; Lee, 2003: 142) who often cannot yet compete on global markets (Odén, 2000: 
247). Proving this assumption, the trade balance between the R.S.A. and the rest of 
SADC is throughout advantageous for the first for years. In 2006 the trade surplus 
totalled about three billion US-$ (TIPS TradeMAP Database). South Africa’s exports 
to the community’s members consist mainly of value-added manufactured goods, 
while imports are composed largely of lower-value primary commodities (Cureau, 
2004: 103 ff). Hence, a classic asymmetric ’North-South’ trading-pattern seems to 
exist within the broader framework of ‘South-South’ cooperation. 
Considering comparative cost advantages, the situation is similar. Although 
the R.S.A.’s economy is quite diversified, other neighbouring economies lack this 
characteristic, which therefore limits potential for related benefits and economic 
gains. Comparative cost advantages from the interaction between the R.S.A. and the 
rest of SADC are most likely to occur in sectors such as labour force (Bauer, 2004: 
17), natural resources and certain foodstuffs (Odén, 2001: 90 f). Looking closer, 
there additionally exists as yet unexploited potential for South Africa to substitute 
imports from overseas in the fields of medicine, precious stones and metals, 
(components of) vehicles, furniture and machinery, printed materials and particular 
fossil energy sources with equivalent imports from SADC (Draper, Alves & Kalaba, 
2006: 73 ff). The latter is becoming increasingly important as energy and electricity 
production runs noticeably short in the region causing an increase in the need for oil 
(e.g. from Angola) or waterpower (e.g. from the DRC or Lesotho). Regional 
cooperation and integration in the energy-sector is not only demanded by 
governments, but in particular by major power producers14 who strive to tap 
additional capacities and open up new markets (Daniel & Lutchman, 2006: 494 ff; 
Meyns, 2000: 143; TIPS TradeMap Database). 
                                               
13 Details regarding the campaign: http://www.proudlysa.co.za (06/22/08). 
14 Considerably influential is the Eskom parastatal which is a South African Enterprise and Africa’s 
overall biggest power producer (Meyns, 2000: 143 f). 
Johannes Muntschick, Dipl.-Pol | Lichtenhaidestraße 11, D-96052 Bamberg, Germany | johannes.muntschick@uni-bamberg.de  
 15 
However, besides the rather exceptional situation of the R.S.A., the total 
demand for regional integration deriving from comparative cost advantages is, 
according to the overall evidence, rather limited and probably not very decisive 
among Southern African countries. Demand factors mentioned above are certainly 
not satisfactory to explain the organisation’s recent dynamics and the willingness of 
countries to participate in it. With focus on the majority of small and less developed 
member states, other sources of demand fuelling regional integration are likely 
existent and are probably of much greater importance: 
The attraction of FDI as a development strategy15 and measure to boost local 
economy is certainly a major demand factor for regional integration within SADC, 
considering economically based motivation (Lee, 2003: 144). With volatile and even 
stagnating foreign investment in SADC on the verge of the millennium (Lee, 2003: 
164 f; Meyn, 2006: 78, 136), additional pressures from major economic and political 
actors16 to foster regional integration and trade liberalisation have taken effect and 
are rather likely to continue and intensify in the nearer future (Grobbelaar, 2004: 102 
f; Taylor, 2007: 154 ff). Regarding the R.S.A., demand is especially rooted in the 
necessity to provide global investors an attractive and investment-friendly business-
environment with an enlarged market, removed trade-barriers, good infrastructure, 
political stability and high consumer potential. In short: with membership in the 
SADC, the R.S.A. tries to provide this investment-friendly atmosphere beyond its own 
territory by opening up and including its hinterland – respectively SACU – and other 
(economically) weaker SADC member states. Through this attractiveness, the 
investors’ demands could be satisfied better – even from a global perspective (Lee, 
2003, 148 f, 164 f; Odén, 2000: 260). Particularly transnational corporations of South 
African origin are interested in further economic integration in the region for similar 
reasons. It would certainly simplify their entering of the partially very lucrative 
emerging markets in the community’s member states and facilitate the companies’ – 
sometimes critically scrutinised – investment and expansion policies (Grobbelaar, 
2004: 101 ff).    
                                               
15 Of most considerable importance are implied spill-over effects of FDI (Goldstein, 2004: 11).  
16 The R.S.A., for instance, is home to a variety of influential business associations, investment 
agencies and companies in the rank of regional or even global players. They are often engaged in 
Joint-Ventures with enterprises in neighbouring SADC countries. In South Africa, relations between 
business and government have been close and rather friendly since apartheid times. Thus business 
interests are still likely to influence national policymakers (Taylor, 2007: 154, 159, 184; Tleane, 2006; 
Vogt, 2007: 91).  
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Focussing on smaller and less developed states of Southern Africa, the 
demand for regional integration has similar roots. The attraction of FDI and its 
implicated benefiting effects is probably even more crucial for their development 
compared to that of the R.S.A.. As their own small markets do not meet the 
preconditions and incentives to attract considerable FDI (especially from overseas), 
SADC membership, with its investment-friendly effects, is an advisable strategy to 
get at least some crumbles of the ‘FDI-cake’ (Buthelezi, 2006: 179; Draper, Alves & 
Kalaba, 2006: 21 f). However, they focus especially on the attraction of investors 
from the R.S.A., which traditionally provides the major share of the region’s total 
FDI.17 Between 1994 and 2003, for seven SADC members the R.S.A. was the top 
foreign investor providing a share of more than 70 % (DRC, Swaziland) or 80 % 
(Lesotho, Malawi) of total foreign investment. Besides its relatively large impact, 
further potential for SADC countries to attract more South African FDI certainly 
exists, as Africa in general receives only a marginal share of the Republic’s total 
outward FDI flows (Grobbelaar, 2004: 93 ff).   
A significant growth in direct investment from the R.S.A. to neighbouring 
SADC countries has been noticed since the end of apartheid in 1994 (Odén, 2001: 
90; Goldstein, 2004: 51 f). Therefore, demand to become an ‘insider’ of the 
community has probably also increased, as costs of being an ‘outsider’18 are 
significant. The case of Madagascar, SADC’s most recent member state, is an 
example where particularly the above-mentioned demand factors were decisive and 
strong enough to push traditionally sceptical national leaders forward to join the 
community in 2005 (SAIIA, 2005: 2 ff). Eight years earlier, similar reasons created 
demand in the DRC to join SADC, especially the chance for investment from – and 
closer cooperation with – the regional hegemon (Vogt, 2007: 92).  
In general, most SADC members experienced steadily or fast growing net FDI 
between 1995 and 2002, as in Namibia with 157m US-$ (1995) vs. 247m US-$ 
(2002), Lesotho with 30m US-$ (1995) vs. 90m US-$ (2002), and especially Angola 
with 303m US-$ (1995) vs. 1.312m US-$ in 2002 (Oosthuizen, 2006: 262). Although 
the absolute figures vary, and are not always consistent and show some interruptions 
                                               
17 One should mention against this background that South African investment and business 
engagement does not lack criticism. Some smaller countries and enterprises fear an economic re-
colonisation or second ‘Scramble for Africa’ by an alleged sub-imperialist regional hegemon (Tleane, 
2006; Daniel & Lutchman, 2006: 484 ff). 
18 Details concerning the costs and benefits of being ‚insiders’ and ‚outsiders’ of regional 
arrangements are explained by Mattli (Mattli, 1999: 60 f). 
Johannes Muntschick, Dipl.-Pol | Lichtenhaidestraße 11, D-96052 Bamberg, Germany | johannes.muntschick@uni-bamberg.de  
 17 
and temporarily declines, the SADC region as a whole has attracted significantly 
more foreign direct investment in recent years. Especially from 2004 to 2005, the 
inflow rose exponentially with investments particularly taking place in the banking, 
telecommunication and mining sectors (Hartzenberg & Mathe, 2005: 11; UNCTAD 
World Investment Report, 2006: 44).    
According to theoretical considerations, further demand for regional integration 
among Southern African countries derives from the need to attract donors’ funds 
and/or foreign aid (Oosthuizen, 2006: 324). As international, European and even 
several national aid and development policies have changed and nowadays focus 
explicitly on strengthening and supporting regional integration projects (Kennes, 
1999: 38; Tjønneland, 2008), SADC became a magnet, and membership the key to 
access or participate in these funds.19 As an example, the European Union provides, 
at present, roughly € 105 million20 for a variety of ongoing SADC projects with focus 
on infrastructure, promotion of intra-regional trade/investment and institutional 
capacity building. Nevertheless, ‘emerging donors’ like China, Brazil and India have 
become increasingly important for the region, although only the latter explicitly 
cooperates with SADC institutions (Tjønneland, 2008: 23 f). Not least, about 80 % of 
the costs of total internal SADC projects were financed by external actors/donors 
between the years 1992 and 2002 (Odén, 2000: 261; Lee, 2003: 53; Vogt, 2007: 101 
f).  
The chance to enhance local infrastructure through these funds via SADC 
membership seems especially appealing, as it is a major prerequisite for increased 
(intra-regional) trade, and agglomeration of industries and thus development (Hecht 
& Weis, 2001, 64 f). However, although donors’ funding promotes development in the 
SADC region, the high reliance on this aid may cause dependencies and become a 
problem if inflows should run dry. A future loophole for SADC, e.g. in negotiations 
with the EU, could be a policy of ‘Trade for Aid’ which connects the former’s further 
regional integration and opening of markets with aid ‘payments’ of the latter that 
could be regarded as necessary compensations. However, the line of arguments and 
policies could also happen vice versa, with Europe putting pressure on SADC to 
liberalise trade in exchange for further/additional support through aid and other funds. 
                                               
19 SADC may still have a nimbus for being popular for donors’ support due to SADCC’s good 
reputation (Odén, 2000: 255). 
20 Figure in accordance to the European Commission’s Delegation to Botswana. 
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A similar situation can be observed regarding the relationship and bargaining 
between the BLNS21 and the R.S.A. (Cureau, 2004: 108 ff; van der Staak, 2007: 4 f). 
Apart from the economic demand factors mentioned above, a growing need to 
prepare the whole region for globalisation regarding economic competitiveness and 
political bargaining power should be insinuated. Further demand for regional 
integration among Southern African states rises from the prospect to enhance 
political stability and (human) security within a rather unstable environment. Gaining 
access to new technologies and expert-knowledge, fostering harmonisation and 
cooperation in economically and strategically important sectors (especially transport, 
electricity, water and police) will be crucial in the future (Cawthra, 2007: 88 ff). 
Without basic peace and reliable political systems and governments, all efforts to 
gain global attractiveness and prospects for sustainable socioeconomic development 
would become meaningless. A partially common historical22 and cultural23 
background of some southern SADC countries may additionally strengthen pure 
politically or economically motivated demand (Odén, 2000: 261; Vogt, 2007: 96 f, 166 
f, 250 f).  
As private economic actors and civil society are generally weak and 
unorganised in most SADC countries – again the situation in the R.S.A. is rather 
exceptional (Bauer & Taylor, 2005: 264 ff) – demand probably mainly derives from 
political entrepreneurs on the state level. However, since the importance of the 
private sector has recently been recognised by SADC, it has led inter alia to the 
establishment of the ‘SADC Business Forum’ (SBF) by non-state actors. An 
emergence of similar trade negotiation forums on the national level can additionally 
be observed in several SADC countries (Bertelsmann-Scott, 2007: 10). Their 
sophisticated engagement may eventually even contribute to further regional 
integration (Taylor, 2007: 13 f; Tjønneland, Isaksen & le Pere, 2005: 9 f; Vogt, 2007: 
269 f, 274 f). 
In Summary, economically motivated demand for regional integration in Southern 
Africa, the centre of gravity lies surely within the R.S.A. as economic giant and major 
beneficiary with significant and influential ‘big business’. Demand in smaller countries 
                                               
21 These are Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
22 The common history of being white settler-colonies with minority-ruled apartheid regimes 
encompasses the R.S.A., Namibia, Zimbabwe – and to lesser degree – Zambia and perhaps 
Botswana. Additionally, in these states English is the/an official language. 
23 Most African ethnicities in the SADC-region belong to the Bantu-family which has common cultural 
and linguistic roots. 
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is less obvious, but likely if the chance for economic gains and socioeconomic 
development exists. Of crucial importance is the attraction of FDI and donors’ aid 
through assumed good governance within the SADC regional integration 
arrangement which should ideally guarantee political stability, security and thus a 
promising business environment. Hence (human) security and defence cooperation 
should be considered as an important part of SADC’s overall developmental strategy.  
 
3.2. Supply for Regional Integration in SADC 
 
As pure economically motivated demand for regional integration is rather limited in 
Southern Africa, one could assume that supply conditions are likewise unfortunate. 
SACU was forced into existence by colonial masters and therefore its evolution 
should not be taken into analytical consideration. With regard to SADCC, the 
willingness of political leaders to join the first volunteer regional arrangement was 
surely given because of common aims, policies and coordination necessities against 
the apartheid regime in South Africa, together with the prospect of donors’ financial 
support. Regarding the supply side, the nucleus for regional integration lies within 
negations of political actors on the intergovernmental level (Meyn, 2006: 45 f). 
With the transformation to SADC and the accession of the R.S.A., the whole 
organisation turned its main aims and strategy to broader economic cooperation and 
‘regional integration for development’ (Mair & Peters-Berries, 2001: 303). Originally, 
SADC’s institutional structure was highly decentralised in order to leave room for 
member states to specialise in their assigned policy fields, to avoid mechanisms 
making them accountable to the community and to prevent the emergence of a 
costly, huge and centralised bureaucratic apparatus. The ‘Summit of Heads of State’ 
was the essential organ to negotiate common policies and control the community. 
Decisions there needed to be made unanimously. Thus supply for regional 
integration could only be derived from the intergovernmental level (Lee, 2003: 51; 
Mair & Peters-Berries, 2001: 309 f; Vogt, 2007: 90 f). 
With the institutional reforms and amendments to the SADC treaty following 
the 2001 ‘Windhoek Declaration’, the rather inefficient decentralised character of 
SADC was formally shifted towards more centralisation, as the numerous and 
nationwide dispersed ‘Sector Coordination Units’ (SCU) were bundled into four 
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directorates24 located at the SADC Headquarters in Gaborone. In those institutional 
core clusters cooperation is actually handled and planning and coordination of 
common policies takes place (Oosthuizen, 2006: 200 ff; Vogt, 2007: 141 ff). 
Nevertheless, the institutional mainspring for supply to regional integration still lies 
within the ‘Summit’ as the organisation’s supreme decision making organ and 
decisive intergovernmental policy entrepreneur. An equally important organ is the 
‘Council of Ministers’25 (CoM) where SADC’s decision-making de facto takes place. 
Furthermore, it supervises the overall functioning of SADC, advises the ‘Summit’ and 
develops broad strategies to implement common policies and programs (Vogt, 2007: 
131 f; Amended SADC Treaty: Article 11, 2).    
The SADC Treaty, several protocols and especially the ‘Regional Indicative 
Strategic Development Plan’ (RSIDP) and the ‘Strategic Indicative Plan for the 
Organ’ (SIPO) contain – sometimes very detailed, sometimes rather vague – aims, 
policies and steps on the process towards regional integration and socioeconomic 
development. However, they do not directly affect national law by means of 
secondary law. Thus their supply side effect is limited to the plain text which cannot 
generate additional supply dynamics per se. Implementation remains a national affair 
and is often delayed by member states due to various circumstances. Hence supply 
depends initially on the implementation capacities, the timeframe and political 
commitment of the signatories (Oosthuizen, 2006: 125 ff; Vogt, 2007: 84 f, 96 f, 114 
f). 
Nevertheless, the institutional reform starting in 2001 opened up small 
potentiality for supranational supply side mechanisms: 
Firstly, the role of the SADC Secretariat as the main executive and 
representative organ was strengthened to the disadvantage of the member states 
and their sectors of policy coordination competence represented by the former SCU. 
This clustering into four directorates can be regarded as proof of an ongoing 
deepening of the regional integration process. Some of the Secretariat’s new tasks 
imply an increase of institutional status. Besides strategic planning, policy analysis 
and organisational work, this supranational body is inter alia commissioned to sign 
treaties with other international organisations, to bring up cases to the SADC 
                                               
24 These are namely the ‘Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI), the ‘Infrastructure and 
Service’ (IS), the ‘Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) and the ‘Social and Human 
Development and Special Programmes’ (SHDSP) directory (Oosthuizen, 2006: 200 ff). 
25 The COM consists mainly of the member states’ Foreign Ministers (Oosthuizen, 2006: 191 ff). 
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Tribunal, to monitor national contribution payments and independently enact 
sanctions against defaulting member states. Furthermore, it coordinates, monitors 
and evaluates the implementation process and complies with SADC’s regional 
principles and programs and thus supervises the sovereign member states to a 
certain degree. An attached planning-office is intended to coordinate the work of the 
four directorates (Kaunda, 2008: 73 f). Equally important is the Secretariat’s function 
as principal administrative institution of SADC. It is also responsible for mobilising 
resources, raising funds from donors and coordinating the financing and 
implementation of common (developmental) projects together with donors. Only 
recently have the directorates established several ‘Thematic Groups’, together with 
one major foreign lead donor at a time, in order to coordinate and harmonise donor 
support and resource mobilisation. Besides facilitating better interaction between 
donor agencies, this measure also aims to strengthen SADC’s capacity in this vital 
field (Tjønneland, 2008: 12 ff). Although the secretariat lacks its own mechanism to 
enforce any sanctions, and despite the fact that no sovereign rights have yet been 
transferred to it, the Secretariat’s main responsibility can be described as no less 
than to actively and independently foster the integration process (Amended SADC 
Treaty; Oosthuizen, 2006: 195 f; Vogt, 2007: 93, 133 ff, 141).  
Altogether, the Secretariat can perhaps be compared to the EU–Commission 
as the supranational ‘motor’ for integration with potential for (small) spill-over. 
Nevertheless, its power and influence is still very limited and particularly depends on, 
aside from sufficient financial resources and skilled, committed staff, the goodwill of 
SADC’s national leaders (Kaunda, 2008: 80 ff). 
Secondly, supply for regional integration could derive from the single real 
supranational body: the SADC-Tribunal. This major institution has inter alia exclusive 
jurisdiction over disputes between member states versus SADC, and thus functions 
as the community’s independent dispute settlement body regarding, in particular, 
compliance to SADC treaty (Vogt, 2006: 102 f). However, as only member states and 
the SADC organs can easily institute legal proceedings, the Tribunal’s capacity to 
supply regional integration is probably limited, as members are not (yet) eager to go 
to court against each other due to SADC’s tradition of consensus and avoidance of 
open conflicts. The hurdles for natural and legal persons to initiate a legal case are in 
practice very high, although not impossible to overcome (Oosthuizen, 2006: 208 ff). 
As the SADC-Tribunal has only been operational since August 2005, it is probably 
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too early to judge its impact and outcomes (Vogt, 2007: 150 f). However, only 
recently white commercial farmers from Zimbabwe turned to it and started a legal 
procedure against their government’s land confiscation and eviction policies. This 
pending landmark case will certainly be a decisive test for the institution and its 
impartial judgements, recognition and authority. As rulings are binding to member 
states, the Tribunal’s role as a promising supply agent for regional integration and it’s 
– and probably SADC’s – overall reputation are equally at stake (Peta, B. & Moyo, 
2007).  
Thirdly, supply for regional integration in general, and regarding security and 
defence in particular, could derive from the organisation’s security and defence 
cooperation institutions and especially SADC’s ‘Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security’ (OPDS) with its subordinated bodies. Although the board of the organ – the 
Troika26 – is of intergovernmental character and does not yet have power to 
autonomously enact sanctions or military action, the demand and intention to foster 
cooperation and deeper integration in this policy segment is considerable, and the 
emergence of supply is therefore likely (Vogt, 2007: 158 f, 189 f). Nevertheless, 
because of its institutional history, the Organ appears to be not truly synchronised 
with the rest of SADC, as it follows a rather detached cooperation and integration 
process with divergent priority (Kaunda, 2008: 78 f). 
The aims and objectives regarding SADC’s political and security cooperation 
are put down in detail in the ‘Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation’ 
and the SIPO, together with its implementation framework (Oosthuizen, 2006: 127). 
Officially, common SADC military operations already took place in Lesotho (1998) 
and the DRC (1998). However, both times realpolitik prevailed and rather unilateral 
action of a single major SADC member state together with smaller partners in a 
‘coalition of the willing’ was prevalent, and only afterwards was it scantily patched up 
by a ‘SADC fig-leaf’ consisting of declarations conjuring the communality of these 
SADC interventions (Bischoff, 2006: 156 ff; Fisher & Ngoma, 2005; Ngoma, 2005: 
166 f). To avoid similar rifts within the community, SADC’s institutions of security and 
defence cooperation (particularly the OPDS) were fundamentally reformed in 2001. 
Additionally, in August 2003, member states made a further step toward deeper 
regional cooperation by signing the ‘SADC Mutual Defence Pact’. Interdependence in 
this very sensitive and crucial policy area is thus recognised and cemented: After 
                                               
26 The Troika consist of the incoming, present and outgoing chairperson of the OPDS (Oosthuizen, 
2006: 217 f). 
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entering into force, the community will thus represent itself as a united block towards 
potentially aggressive third countries (Ngoma, 2005: 200 ff.; SADC Mutual Defence 
Pact). Finally, the wishes and need for a common regional military standby-force 
were approved by the Summit in August 2007 and manifest in the current creation of 
the ‘SADC Standby Brigade’ with an intended strength of 6,000 men (Franke, 2007; 
von Soest & Scheller, 2006: 6). 
Despite reformed institutions, economic and trade, and defence and security 
related outcomes, further dynamics of supply in SADC cooperation have – or are on 
the way to being – materialised in common projects and settlements regarding inter 
alia energy and water (e.g. Southern African Power Pool), tourism (e.g. Transfrontier 
Conservation Areas, introduction of a common SADC-wide visa), transport (road 
projects, e.g. Maputo Development Corridor, Walvis Bay–Gauteng Corridor), 
education (e.g. reduced fees for SADC-nationals at universities), standardisation 
(e.g. SADC driver’s licence, harmonised customs forms and visa) and 
telecommunications (Meyns, 2000: 144; Mpofu, 2008; Mulaudzi, 2006: 12 ff; Vogt, 
2007: 250 f). 
Pooling the insights, significant supply for regional integration deriving from 
supranational SADC institutions is (still) very limited, as they are weak in various 
respects and in general rather powerless. This situation diminishes the chance for 
spill-over effects and their alleged positive impact in enhancing the integration 
process. A pincer-movement is not yet likely in SADC, as potential private economic 
actors or civil society actors are likewise generally27 weak, unorganised and 
sometimes even face state-imposed obstacles28 to manifest their influence. However, 
the actual case of Zimbabwean farmers going to law indicates dynamics in this area, 
and its outcome could be the nucleus for such a pincer-movement or at least 
demonstrate the possibility of it. The future role and influence of the Tribunal in 
fuelling deeper regional integration is therefore currently in a vital phase. 
The ‘Summit’ and the CoM, where intergovernmental negotiations take place and 
major policy decisions are made by consensus, are currently probably the most 
crucial sources for SADC’s further integration process. Here, the R.S.A., as regional 
hegemon and pivotal country, surely has the main bargaining power compared to 
                                               
27 Here, the R.S.A. remains a regional exception again, as many civil society actors and NGOs have 
been active in the country since the time of Apartheid. The same is true for influential economic actors 
(Bauer & Taylor, 2005).  
28 The patronising and persecution of NGOs, societal and political actors by Mugabe’s autocratic 
regime in Zimbabwe is probably the most prominent and recent example.   
Johannes Muntschick, Dipl.-Pol | Lichtenhaidestraße 11, D-96052 Bamberg, Germany | johannes.muntschick@uni-bamberg.de  
 24 
other member states due to its superior capabilities to exert economic and political 
influence. As demand factors have shown, South Africa’s interest and need to foster 
regional integration is strongly given for various reasons and therefore also the 
likelihood to actively engage in supplying and pushing deeper integration – perhaps 
even by disregarding the interests and fears of weaker member states (Adebajo 
2007; Jenkins & Thomas, 2001: 167 f; Vogt, 2007: 172 f, 269 f, 276 f). 
For instance, the R.S.A. – in persona Nelson Mandela – fairly unilaterally 
propelled and proposed SADC-membership to the DRC and thus passed over other 
member states’ voices and the stipulated institutional way of proceeding. 
Furthermore, under President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa significantly influenced 
SADC’s institutional reforms and inter alia had the authority to induce – particularly 
against Zimbabwe – the institutionalisation of the newly created OPDS under the 
umbrella of the SADC organisation (Lee, 2003: 65 f). Earlier, negotiations regarding 
the ‘Protocol on Trade’29 were dominated and influenced by the R.S.A. which even 
threatened to leave SADC in the event of disapproval. Hence a decisive document 
operating as a major supply factor towards deeper economic integration was more or 
less unilaterally enforced by the R.S.A., the country that probably will also gain most 
benefits of this particular agreement and its impacts (Jenkins & Thomas, 2001: 167 f; 
Lee, 2003: 110 f, Vogt, 2007: 196 f, 282 f). Despite these examples of realpolitik, the 
R.S.A. also plans to implement a SADC ‘Regional Development Fund’ as a 
compensational measure in view of smaller members’ impending tax losses resulting 
from removed trade-barriers and lower customs revenues (Vogt, 2007: 149). Such 
deliberate policies would surely indicate the goodwill of the ‘New South Africa’ 
towards the weaker states and may pave the way for them to gain trust and 
eventually accept further supply initiated by the dominant regional actor.   
Nevertheless, the role and perception of South Africa as “hegemonic state in regional 
terms” (Adebajo, 2007: 30) is rather ambivalent, often disputed and probably not yet 
settled. Particularly against the background of regional integration, questions arise 
about whether the country’s policies are interventionist or neglecting, patronising or 
promotional, benevolent or malevolent. Does it have sufficient and widely accepted 
legitimacy for its actions: is it a regional Messiah or Pariah? Besides those 
considerations, certainly the R.S.A. – probably along with the highly integrated SACU 
                                               
29 One aim of the protocol as a first step towards further economical integration is the creation of a free 
trade area which implies the significant reduction of internal trade-barriers and customs (SADC 
Protocol on Trade, Article 2, 5).  
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members – remains the strongest supporter and engine for further integration. The 
formerly quite developed rival Zimbabwe lost influence significantly due to 
authoritative rule, economic depression and growing regional and international 
isolation. Thus the country – and at the present time increasingly Angola – is an 
obstacle for a dedicated, further integration progress, while the opposite could be 
possible if Zimbabwe was politically stable and economically prosperous (Adebajo & 
Landsberg, 2003: 172; Adebajo, 2007; Tleane, 2006). Then one could even assume 
a situation comparable to Europe, where the most important continental economies 
formed a fruitful alliance pushing forward cooperation and integration despite 
traditional aversion and hostilities of the past. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Southern Africa is not an easy region in which to establish a well operating, highly 
integrated regional integration project. Economically motivated demand is generally 
low and significantly prevalent only in some of the more developed and integrated 
SACU member countries. Especially the R.S.A., with its very dominant economic and 
political power, regards further regional cooperation as beneficial for its own 
development and preparation to cope with globalisation. Besides (human) security 
matters, the prospect for significant gains from inflowing FDI, donors’ funds and 
foreign aid mainly creates the demand in small and weaker Southern African 
countries to participate in SADC. But this is probably not sufficient motivation for 
enhancing further integration or maintaining the entire organisation. The possibility of 
an increase intra-regional trade seems to be a given, but is not yet really practicable 
due to several obstacles. The establishment of the SADC FTA30 in August 2008 is 
certainly a big step forward, although not all SADC member countries are fully 
participating from the beginning, and practical implementation will probably encounter 
various difficulties. 
As SADC’s supranational institutions are (as yet) fairly powerless, supply for 
ongoing regional integration derives mainly from the most capable, interested and 
benefiting nation: South Africa. As the pivotal state, the R.S.A. needs to become a 
benevolent regional leader and policy entrepreneur if further integration is desirable 
along with weaker and slightly mistrusting partners. However, considering certain 
                                               
30 The organisation’s very recently updated website gives further information regarding the aims and 
(process of) implementation of the SADC FTA: http://www.sadc.int/fta (15/7/2008). 
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animosities between some Southern African political leaders and country-specific 
rivalries, this source of supply fuelling deeper regional integration is not gushing too 
well at all at the moment.  
Unfortunately, clear indicators signalling strong, enduring economic 
performance for all participants – particularly attributed to SADC membership – are 
difficult to isolate, or do not yet really exist. This makes further supply even more 
complicated. Additional obstacles to deeper integration stem from inter alia the 
overlapping memberships of several SADC members in other regional arrangements 
(Draper, Halleson & Alves, 2007; Shilimela, 2008), the poor situation in Zimbabwe, 
lack of members’ commitment and the alleged inefficiency and ineffectiveness of 
SADC’s unsettled institutions and organs (Oosthuizen, 2006: 327; Oosthuizen, 2007: 
95 f).  
Nevertheless, regional integration seems to be one promising way for less developed 
countries to gain and enhance (human) security, political stability and overall 
socioeconomic development. Notwithstanding the difficulties, the SADC region 
records several positive achievements due to this process and increased cooperation 
(Oosthuizen, 2007: 96 f). At best, this could prepare the R.S.A. and other member 
countries for globalisation, making them more trustworthy, competitive and attractive 
for the rest of the world. Getting an adequate share of globalisation’s benefits and 
thus achieving affluence in a peaceful environment: This is certainly the present-
day’s meta-demand and main incentive for regional integration in Southern Africa. 
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